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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article assesses the impact of the latest Supreme Court deci-
sions on the use of affirmative action' in law school admissions. Al-
though references are made to Gratz v. Bollinger2 and Grutter v.
Bollinger,3 the two companion cases arising out of the University of
Michigan, the main focus of the Article will be on Grutter. Grutter
dealt with the use of race in law school admissions and there, in con-
trast to Gratz, the Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action pro-
gram under challenge.4
The Article argues that Grutter was inevitable as a culmination
and jellification of best practices on the use of race as a factor in ad-
missions to law schools that has been building since the Supreme
Court's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in
1. Affirmative action is the use of race or gender as a factor in decisions relating to pub-
lic contracting, public employment, and public education. HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C.
SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM
217 (2d ed. 2003). Although this Article touches on the various aspects of affirmative action,
its main emphasis is on race in relation to public education. In the past, the U.S. government
has sponsored certain special relief benefits for groups in American society, such as the pro-
grams under the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 during the period following the Civil War.
See id. at 227-29. But, affirmative action, as we know it today, came into vogue beginning in
the 1960s during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies when the federal government ordered
these programs implemented to alleviate the lingering effects of past discrimination. Id. at
217-18; Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 15, re-
printed in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 14, 15 (Bryan J. Grapes ed., 2000).
2. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (holding that the University of Michigan's use of race in ad-
missions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Grutter, 539
U.S. at 343 (holding that the University of Michigan Law School's use of race in admissions
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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1978.1 Logically, such an argument leaves little room for any analysis
of impact. But, that is not the sense in which impact in this Article is
used. Instead, the basis and significance of the analysis of impact
here-and another argument of the Article-is that despite its inevita-
bility as a congealment of best practices in affirmative action, Grutter
is still momentous because public higher educational institutions6 can
now openly use race in their admissions decisions rather than resort,
as in the past, to "winks, nods, and disguises" and related techniques
to camouflage their use of race.7
The Article has five main parts, plus this introduction and a con-
clusion. Part II presents an overview of the Grutter case and a com-
parison of that case with its companion case Gratz. A look at the re-
actions to Grutter, represented in published commentaries on the case
in academic and popular media, completes the discussion in Part II.
Part III presents an overview of the character of minority participation
in the legal profession in America, while Part IV examines the ihflu-
ence of race in law school admissions. Part IV also integrates exten-
sive and critical discussion in various aspects, including the evolution
of the Supreme Court's option for the use of race as a tool of inclu-
siveness, the use of race in law school admissions by law schools and
legal organizations, and an examination of the consequences for mi-
nority participation in legal education arising from ceasing to use race
as a factor in law school admissions decisions. Parts V and VI, indi-
vidually and collectively, embody the main arguments of the Article.
Part V presents an understanding of Grutter as a culmination, exem-
plification, and congealment of best practices regarding the use of race
in public education since Bakke, while Part VI analyzes the impact of
Grutter on race-conscious programs. More specifically, Part VI ad-
vances reasons why, although arguably Grutter amounts to a jellifica-
5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Although the Equal Protection Clause binds only state-owned or public education
institutions, affirmative action also applies to private universities. See Kim Forde-Mazrui,
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEo. L.J. 2331, 2345
(2000). The Harvard Plan, the affirmative action program Justice Powell held out as a model
in Bakke, was designed not by a public school, but rather by Harvard University, a private in-
stitution. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. Even more importantly, federal law forbids racial dis-
crimination by institutions that receive federal funding, and most universities, public as well
as private, receive such funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Forde-Mazrui, supra, at 2345.
One such federal law is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in pertinent
part: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." § 2000d.
7. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 304-05 (describing
possible examples of the use of these underhand devices).
3
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tion of prevailing best practices regarding the use of race, it nonethe-
less is so momentous as to justify an impact analysis of the kind this
Article makes.
II. GRUTTER v. BOLL1NGER: GOSPEL OF NARROWLY-TAILORED USE OF
RACE TO PROMOTE A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
Grutter is the one decision that the Supreme Court, in twenty-five
years since Bakke, held out as a model for the constitutionally permis-
sible use of race in the admission process to promote diversity of the
student population of a public education institution.' Grutter, and its
companion Gratz, involved challenges by Caucasian applicants to the
affirmative action programs of the University of Michigan, a public
education institution funded by the State of Michigan. 9 Unlike earlier
challenges, such as in Bakke, by angry white men who believed af-
firmative action reversed discrimination against them,'0 women now
join among complainants against race-conscious programs, an ironic
occurrence given that affirmative action encompasses gender.1' Also,
studies show that white women as a group are singularly the greatest
beneficiaries of preferential programs.12
As already indicated, Grutter involved the University of Michigan
Law School's affirmative action program; 3 Gratz concerned the uni-
versity's undergraduate affirmative action plan, specifically the pro-
gram of the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. 4 Although
they may look different, standing for two diametrically opposed out-
comes and propositions, some key factors link the two decisions to-
gether. In both, the Supreme Court "repudiated the argument that ra-
cial classifications are always odious [and] rejected the claim that race
no longer matters."' 5 Instead, in Grutter, as well as in Gratz, the high
8. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
9. Id. at 316; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251-52.
10. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, 276-78.
11. Tracey Robinson-English, Minority Set-Aside Programs Help Women Get a Piece
of Affirmative Action, N'DIGO (Chi.), Mar. 24-30, 2005, at 7. Women were plaintiffs in both
the Grutter and Gratz cases. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
12. Robinson-English, supra note 11, at 7 (citing a recent study showing that "[olverall,
White women are the biggest winners of affirmative action programs, claiming more than 40
percent of all managerial or professional jobs in the late 1990s .... "); see also ANDREW
HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 132 (1992)
("[W]hite women have benefited more... than have black men.").
13. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311.
14. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251-52.
15. Lani Guinier, The Constitution Is Both Colorblind and Color-Conscious, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 4, 2003, at B 11; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg,
[Vol. 42
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court gave its "imprimatur to holistic considerations of race" by uni-
versities for purposes of realizing the benefits of diversity.,6 Further,
the two decisions "reinforce the importance of employing flexible and
individualized considerations of race in admissions."' 7  In both, as
Professor Guinier of Harvard Law School points out, the Supreme
Court drew a
line[] between considerations of race that are nuanced, on one hand, and
"mechanistic," on the other. The former are permissible, the latter sus-
pect. As long as the decision maker is "hand picking" rather than machine
sorting, the decision maker is free to consider race as one of many factors
in order to realize the benefits of diversity.'
8
A. Overview of the Case
In Grutter, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a
GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT score of 161, was denied admission to the
University of Michigan Law School, one of the nation's top law
schools. 9 She challenged the university's admissions policy under the
U.S. Constitution and federal laws, alleging that the law school dis-
criminated against her based on her race.2° She contended that "the
J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court acknowledges [that educational institutions] are not barred from
any and all consideration of race when making admissions decisions.").
16. Guinier, supra note 15.
17. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS
(2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/policy/court/michigansc.php.
18. Guinier, supra note 15.
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312, 316 (2003). For more information on Bar-
bara Grutter by the law school admissions officer who reviewed her application, see Dennis J.
Shields, A View from the Files: Law School Admissions and Affirmative Action, 51 DRAKE L.
REV. 731, 741-44 (2003).
20. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. Ms. Grutter claimed the law school's admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides, in part, "[n]o State shall .. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The pertinent federal laws
Ms. Grutter claimed were violated are Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Title VI applies to institutions receiving
federal funds, including private colleges and universities. See id. Section 1981(a) provides:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts .... and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). Section 1981 applies to public and private contracts,
such as the contract that is formed when a college or university admits a student. See Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (explaining that a contract for educational services
qualifies as a contract for purposes of § 1981). It is inescapably odd for white litigants to be
5
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Law School['s use of] race as a 'predominant' factor [gave minority
applicants] 'a significantly greater chance of admission than students
with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups,"' and that the
law school authorities "had no compelling interest to justify their use
of race in the admissions process. 21
The university's admissions policy was based on Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke and sought "to achieve student body diversity. 22
Student body diversity was "not define[d] . . . 'solely in terms of racial
and ethnic status."' 23 Nor did the policy "restrict the types of diversity
contributions eligible for 'substantial weight."' 24 Rather, the policy
reaffirm[ed] the Law School's longstanding commitment to "one particu-
lar type of diversity," [namely], "racial and ethnic diversity with special
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been his-
torically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Na-
tive Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in
[the law school's] student body in [a critical mass or] meaningful num-
bers. 25
In its attempt to achieve diversity, the policy emphasized appli-
cants'
academic ability [and] a flexible assessment of [their] talents, experiences,
and potential .... [It] require[d] admissions officials to evaluate each ap-
plicant based on all the information available in the file, including a per-
sonal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay describing [how]
the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School. 6
Admissions officials also looked to the traditional factors of an "appli-
cant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School
asking for protection and benefits "enjoyed by white[s]." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). But
see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that § 1981
applies to discrimination against white individuals as well as to nonwhites). As a result, the
Court has explained that the provision "was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimi-
nation in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race." Id. at 295.
Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, all three provisions are coterminous. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003). Consequently, a use of race consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause also withstands challenge under Title VI and § 1981. See id In con-
trast, a use of race found to violate the Equal Protection Clause is also a violation of Title VI
and § 1981. Id.
21. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 314; see also id. at 313-16, 318-20 (describing the University of Michigan
Law School's admissions policy).
23. Id. at 316.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 315.
[Vol. 42
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Admission Test (LSAT) score. ' 27 Finally, admissions officials con-
sidered "[s]o-called "'soft" variables' such as 'the enthusiasm of re-
commenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution [attended],
the quality of the applicant's essay, and the areas and difficulty of un-
dergraduate course selection"'28 In short, "[a]s part of its goal of 'as-
sembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and
broadly diverse,' the Law School [sought] to 'enroll a "critical mass"
of [under-represented] minority students"' who would contribute to its
character and to the legal profession.29
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan found the law school's use of race as an admissions factor unlaw-
ful.30 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed.3
The Sixth Circuit ruled that diversity could be used to achieve a com-
pelling government interest and that the law school's use of race to
promote that interest was narrowly tailored,32 given that race was
merely a "potential 'plus' factor" in admissions decision making33 and
because the affirmative action program under challenge was "virtually
identical" to the Harvard admissions program Justice Powell endorsed
and appended to his opinion in Bakke.34
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id. (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 329. "Critical mass" means that under-represented minorities are enrolled in
"meaningful numbers" that promote participation in the classroom by minority groups with-
out making them "feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race." Id. at 318-19.
30. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The District
Court did not believe diversity amounted to a compelling government interest warranting the
use of race. Id at 849. But assuming diversity was compelling, the use of race was not nar-
rowly tailored to further that interest. Id. at 850. Why, it quizzed, did the law school fail to
consider "race-neutral alternatives" such as "using a lottery system" or "decreasing the em-
phasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores"? Id. at 853.
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002).
32. Id. at 739, 752.
33. Id. at 746.
34. Id. at 749.
7
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In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,35 the Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals.36 Two questions
were presented to the Court. The first was whether student body di-
versity of a public higher-education institution is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest that justifies the use of race in admissions deci-
sions.37 The second was whether the law school's use of race was
narrowly tailored to further the interest in diversity the law school
sought to achieve.38 The Court answered these two questions in the
affirmative,39 anchoring its holdings on Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke.4" Like Justice Powell in Bakke, the Court gave deference to
the law school's judgment "that attain[ment] [of] a diverse student
body is at the heart of [its educational] mission."41 It justified that
deference, among other things, on "the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associ-
ated with the university environment. 42
The Court insisted that the benefits of diversity are real and sub-
stantial, not theoretical, pointing to the plentiful amici curiae briefs
35. Sandra Day O'Connor (1930-), the first woman to serve on the United States Su-
preme Court, is a Republican appointee from Arizona and was appointed by President Ronald
Reagan in 1981. THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 69, 70 (1997) (including a description of Justice
O'Connor's background, voting record, and judicial philosophy). She replaced another Re-
publican, Justice Potter Stewart. Id. at 70. True to the expectations of the Reagan administra-
tion, Justice O'Connor has maintained a generally conservative voting record on issues relat-
ing to civil rights and liberties. Id at 69-70. Together with Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice
O'Connor is viewed as a "swing" vote whose clout on the Court, as here, carries decisive
weight. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Confounds Critics, CI. TRIB., June 29,
2003, at C I.
The conservative wing of the Court consisted of former Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas. Id. This solid bloc has an
antipathy to minority rights. See id. The moderate bloc, consisting of Justices Stephen
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens, is larger than the conser-
vative wing by one justice (and thus one vote). Id. With perhaps the exception of Justice
Ginsburg, none of these moderate justices qualifies to be called a liberal, certainly not in the
mold of Justices William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, or William 0. Douglas. See id.
After twenty-four years on the high court, Justice O'Connor announced her retirement on July
1, 2005, pledging in a letter to President George W. Bush announcing her decision, "I will
leave [the Court] with enormous respect for" its integrity "and its role under our constitutional
structure." Supreme Court Justice O'Connor Retiring, MSNBC.cOM, July 5, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id18430976/page/2/print/l/displaymode/1098/.
36. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
37. Id. at 322.
38. Id. at 322, 339.
39. Id. at 343.
40. Id. at 322-25, 334-44.
41. Id. at 328-29.
42. Id. at 329.
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filed in support of the law school.43 "IT]he diffusion of knowledge
and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must
be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity."" Go-
ing back in time to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the Court
has recognized that "education ... is the very foundation of good citi-
zenship. '45 Elite public education institutions, like the University of
Michigan, form "the training ground for a large number of our Na-
tion's leaders." 46 "Effective participation by members of all racial and
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized. '47 And, "to cultivate a set of
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified indi-
viduals of every race and ethnicity. '48  With particular reference to
law schools, "[a]ccess to legal education (and thus the legal profes-
sion) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society
may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training
and education necessary to succeed in America. 49
The Court ruled that the law school does not give race too much
weight or make it too decisive in decision making regarding student
admissions.5 0 Instead, its "admissions program adequately ensures
that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are mean-
ingfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions."51 "IT]he
Law School seriously weighs many other diversity factors besides
race that can make a real and dispositive difference for nonminority
applicants as well."52 The Court also said the law school's goal of en-
rolling a critical mass of under-represented minorities is a "con-
43. Id. at 330.
44. Id. at 331. Amazingly, given its opposition to race-conscious programs, the United
States agrees with this position. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Pe-
titioner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635. In its
brief, quoted by the Court, the United States stated that "[e]nsuring that public institutions are
open and available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and eth-
nicities, represents a paramount government objective." Id. at 13. In citing this statement,
Justice O'Connor pulled a clever master-stroke that reinforced her point. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 331-32.
45. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)) (omission in original).
46. Id. at 332.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 332-33.
50. Id. at 341.
51. Id. at 337.
52. Id. at 338.
9
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cept ... defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity
is designed to produce"53 that does not therefore rise to unconstitu-
tional racial balancing 4 or a quota." The connection between critical
mass and educational benefits of diversity is borne out by the fact
"that when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority stu-
dents learn there is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of
viewpoints among minority students."56 Finally, the Court determined
the race-conscious program under challenge provided "a highly indi-
vidualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious con-
sideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse
educational environment."57
In Bakke, Justice Powell said that given a proper case, race could
form a "plus" factor used to promote diversity in a public university's
student body.58 In Grutter, the Court found that proper case--one that
withstood strict scrutiny.59
In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote
a separate concurrence, wherein she commented on the Court's idea of
a phase-out date for affirmative action. 60 She said "well documented"
evidence exists of discrimination and biases in many areas of Ameri-
can life, including access to public education, that "imped[es] realiza-
tion of our highest values and ideals."' 6' Given these occurrences,
"[firom today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast,
that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimina-
tion and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset af-
firmative action." 62
Four justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas, each separately dissented from the judgment of
the Court.63 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that
the Court's strict scrutiny is not strict enough; not only did the Court
give unprecedented deference to the law school's educational judg-
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id.; see also id. at 336 (rebutting Chief Justice Rehnquist's contention "that the Law
School's policy conceals an attempt to achieve racial balancing").
55. Id. at 335-36.
56. Id. at 319-20.
57. Id. at 337.
58. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978).
59. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
60. Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 345.
62. Id. at 346.
63. See id. at 310.
[Vol. 42
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ment as to the educational benefit of a diverse student body,' but it
also "casually subverted" the duration of relief, "an important compo-
nent of strict scrutiny," by accepting the law school's "vaguest of as-
surances" that its affirmative action program will be impermanent.65
He also opined that the law school discriminates against other under-
represented minorities (in favor of black applicants) under the guise or
smokescreen of critical mass.66
In his own dissent, Justice Kennedy believed that the Court's def-
erence to the law school's educational judgment is of a magnitude so
inconsistent with strict scrutiny, it works an "abandonment" of the re-
view standard.67 Similar to Justice Powell in Bakke, if given a proper
case, Justice Kennedy would have approved the use of race to promote
diversity.68 However, he did not believe Grutter was such a proper
case. 
69
Justice Scalia contended that "[tlhe Constitution proscribes gov-
ernment discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided educa-
tion is no exception."7 He mockingly questioned the "educational
benefit" embedded in diversity, which he said "is a lesson of life
rather than law" taught to children, such as Boy Scouts and kinder-
gartners, as opposed to "full-grown adults" at law schools.71 He also
questioned critical mass, which throughout his dissent, he enclosed in
quotes72 and alternately referred to as "mystical, ' 73 "fabled, ' 74 and "a
sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions. ' 75  He
believed that the case raised numerous questions relating to issues like
64. Id. at 380 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the language of
our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference.").
65. Id. at 387.
66. Id. at 379-86. For instance, the Chief Justice wrote, "[s]tripped of its 'critical mass'
veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing." Id.
at 379.
67. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not
consistent with it.").
68. Id. at 395.
69. Id. ("[T]hough I reiterate my approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in
this one context, I must dissent in the present case.").
70. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 347.
72. See id. at 346-49.
73. Id. at 346.
74. Id. at 347.
75. Id. During oral arguments in the case, Scalia characterized critical mass as "a
euphemism for a quota." Charles Lane, O'Connor Questions Foes of U-Michigan Policy,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al. As Justice Scalia reportedly said, "once you use the terms
[sic] 'critical mass,' you're in Quota Land." Id.
11
Aka: Assessing the Impact in Grutter on the Use of Race in Law School
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
critical mass and individualized consideration, among others, that
would form the basis for future litigation.76
Justice Thomas's dissent tracked the judgment of the Court in
length77 and was by far the most verbose of all the dissents.78 Thomas
began with a quote attributed to black abolitionist Frederick Douglass,
delivered in Boston in 1865, regarding What the Black Man Wants.79
Douglass urged white people to "[d]o nothing" with blacks because
"your interference is doing him positive injury."8 Justice Thomas
said, "[1]ike Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of
American life without the meddling of university administrators. '81
He said Douglass's message was "lost on [the] majority,"82 whom he
also accused of "uphold[ing] the Law School's racial discrimination
not by interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a
faddish slogan of the cognoscenti."83 He further described the major-
ity as unable to "commit to the principle that racial classifications are
per se harmful and that almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the
beholder can justify such classifications."'  Finally, he disagreed with
Powell's opinion in Bakke, upon which the majority based its judg-
ment.85
Justice Thomas said the Constitution forbids racial classifications
"not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Compare id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(twenty-nine pages in length), with id. at 311-44 (majority opinion) (thirty-two pages in
length).
78. Compare id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(twenty-nine pages in length), with id. at 346-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (three pages in length), and id. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (nine pages in
length), and id. at 387-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (eight pages in length).
79. Id. at 349-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Frederick
Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan.
26, 1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (John W. Blassingame & John R.
McKivigan eds., 1991)).
80. Id. at 349-50.
81. Id. at 350. Some analysts have criticized Justice Thomas for his reference to Doug-
lass. See, e.g., Derrick Z. Jackson, Op-Ed., Mugging Frederick Douglass, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 4, 2003, at A15; Courtland Malloy, Twisting Words in an Effort to Rewrite History,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at Cl. Douglass, who worked for black equality, wanted whites
to do nothing to keep blacks in bondage and would not mind preferential programs designed
to achieve that purpose. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our
Own Future, 47 How. L.J. 499, 547-48 (2004). In contrast, Justice Thomas is no abolitionist
in any sense and categorically opposes all kinds of preferential programs for blacks. Grutter,
539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 350.
84. Id. at 371.
85. Id. at 357.
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based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the gov-
ernment places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to
the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all."86 He said
race-conscious programs stigmatize, claiming "[t]he majority of
blacks ... admitted to the Law School" under affirmative action "are
tarred as undeserving." 87 He branded Justice O'Connor's twenty-five
year expected phase-out date for affirmative action as "a 25-year li-
cense to violate the Constitution."88  He "believe[d] that the Law
School's current use of race violates the Equal Protection Clause and
that the Constitution means the same thing today as it will in 300
months."89
Although his dissent tracked those of the other dissenters, Thomas
went far beyond them and his criticism was more thorough and biting.
He believed the Court deferred too much to the law school's educa-
tional judgment.90 Not only, he said, is strict scrutiny compromised, 9'
but the program in question could never withstand strict scrutiny since
the school's claimed compelling government interest was a "fabri-
cated" one,9 2 designed to maintain its own elite image and status.93 He
questioned the interest in diversity and critical mass. 94 He mocked di-
versity alternately as "aesthetic" 95 and "trivial." 96 Thomas called pref-
erences not based on race, such as "legacy" preferences elite schools
give to the children of alumni, "unseemly," but believed the Constitu-
tion does not forbid them.97 He claimed, however, "[w]ere this Court
to have the courage to forbid the use of racial discrimination in admis-
sions, legacy preferences (and similar practices) might quickly be-
86. Id. at 353.
87. Id. at 373.
88. Id. at 370.
89. Id. at 351; see also id. at 375 ("while I agree that in 25 years the practices of the
Law School will be illegal, they are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now.").
90. Id. at 350, 362-66.
91. See id. at 351-54, 357-62.
92. Id. at 375.
93. See id. at 358.
94. Id. at 354, 374-78.
95. Id. at 355 n.3 ("That is, the Law School wants to have a certain appearance, from
the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students sitting at
them."); see also id. at 372 ("The Law School seeks only a faqade-it is sufficient that the
class looks right, even if it does not perform right."). Justice Thomas also posited, "racial dis-
crimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher educa-
tion and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our Nation." Id.
at 355 n.3.
96. Id. at 357.
97. Id. at 368 ("[W]hile legacy preferences can stand under the Constitution, racial dis-
crimination cannot.").
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come less popular."98 He was of the view that extension of special
preferences for black students to law schools like Michigan gives
them little incentive to prepare for and achieve high scores on the law
school admissions test (LSAT). 99 In sum, in Grutter, Justice Thomas
elaborated, in many words, the declamation embodied in his concur-
rence in Gratz that the Constitution "categorically" forbids racial pref-
erences. 100
B. The Case Compared to Gratz
In Gratz, the Supreme Court invalidated the University of Michi-
gan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts's undergraduate ad-
missions system that awarded twenty points in a 150-point admissions
system to underrepresented minorities (African Americans, Hispanics,
and Native Americans). 01 Like Grutter, the petitioners, who were
two Caucasian applicants, Jennifer Gratz, a female, and Patrick
Hamacher, a male, were denied admission into the program and al-
leged their rights to nondiscriminatory treatment were violated under
the U.S. Constitution and applicable federal laws. 1°2 The petitioners
contended that the university could not base its use of race in under-
graduate admissions on diversity since, to them, diversity "is simply
too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling
interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored means."' 03 In the al-
ternative, the petitioners contended that if "the University's interest in
diversity ... constitute[s] a compelling state interest," its use of race
was not narrowly tailored because its undergraduate admissions guide-
lines "do not 'remotely resemble the kind of consideration of race and
ethnicity that Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke.""'  The university
refuted this allegation, claiming that its "program 'hews closely' to
both the admissions program . . . Justice Powell [described in Bakke
and] the Harvard College admissions program that he endorsed."10 5
98. Id. at 368 n.10.
99. Id. at 377.
100. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 249-51, 254-55.
102. Id. at 251-52.
103. Id. at 268 (citing Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516)).
104. Id. at 269 (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
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In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 10 6 the Court in
Gratz sided with the petitioners.107 There were two issues presented in
the case. The first was whether the use of race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 08 The Court ruled that it did not and that the Constitu-
tion does not categorically preclude the use of race, citing its opinion
in Grutter for support."° The second issue was whether the use of
race in the university's undergraduate admissions program was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity the uni-
versity sought to achieve. "0 The Court found the use of race was "not
narrowly tailored."''. Citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the
Court said there was no "individualized consideration" of appli-
cants. 112  Instead, "[t]he only consideration that accompanies" the
award of twenty points to applicants from under-represented minority
groups was "a factual review of an application to determine whether
an individual is a member of one of these minority groups."1 3 The
Court also said the bonus points made race a "decisive" factor rather
than a "plus" factor, under the approach Justice Powell described in
Bakke. 114
106. William H. Rehnquist (1924-2005), a Republican from Arizona, who was ap-
pointed by President Richard Nixon, joined the Court in 1971. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note
35, at 64. Many civil rights and liberties groups strongly opposed his confirmation by the
Senate. Id. He eventually won confirmation by a vote of sixty-eight in favor and twenty-six
against because of "his impressive academic credentials, his intellectual abilities, and his per-
formance in the Justice Department" under Nixon. Id. He was appointed Chief Justice in
1986 by President Reagan. Id. at 63.
As a young law clerk for Justice Robert Jackson in 1954, Rehnquist wanted to main-
tain the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. See id. at 64. One analyst noted
that "[h]is conservative legal and political views were well known before he came to the
Court, and he has been a strong and consistent advocate of these views throughout his years
on the Court." Id. at 63. Rehnquist did not prove wrong the apprehension by civil rights and
liberties groups that he would be anti-civil rights. See id. at 64. To the contrary, his "voting
record in civil rights and liberties cases [was] consistently conservative throughout his years
on the Court." Id. The Chief Justice was part of a "conservative voting bloc" on the Court
that included Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. Id. at 65. Rehnquist had a "judicial philoso-
phy [made up of] a hierarchy of values .... [which ranks] federalism [as] the highest value,
[followed by] property rights [in the] second level, and individual rights occupying the lowest
[rung] of his hierarchy." Id.
107. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.




112. Id. at 271. The individualized consideration Justice Powell favored in his opinion
in Bakke was "individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes as-
sociated with it." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978).
113. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
114. Id. at 272.
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The Court disagreed with the university's assertion that its system
permitting the flagging of certain applicants for review by an admis-
sions review committee amounted to individualized consideration." 5
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "the flagging program only em-
phasizes the flaws of the University's system as a whole when com-
pared to that described by Justice Powell.""' 6 Second, what little indi-
vidualized review that takes place occurs after points have been
distributed to benefited groups." 7 Finally, the Court also disagreed
with the university's contention that the large volume of applications
to the undergraduate school renders impractical an admissions system
not based on points, maintaining, inter alia, that "[n]othing in Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled that a university may employ
whatever means it desires to achieve the stated goal of diversity with-
out regard to the limits imposed by ... strict scrutiny.""' 8
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she main-
tained that the admissions policy in Gratz "is a nonindividualized,
mechanical one" that "do[es] not provide for a meaningful individual-
ized review of applicants.""' 9 She distinguished the race-conscious
program in Gratz from the program the Court approved in Grutter.12 0
The program in Gratz "ensures that the diversity contributions of ap-
plicants cannot be individually assessed."'' And, it "stands in sharp
contrast [to the program in Grutter] which enables admissions officers
to make nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each ap-
plicant is likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class."'22 Jus-
tice O'Connor shared the opinion of the Court that the committee "re-
views only a portion of all of the applications [leaving t]he bulk of
admissions decisions" to be based on points. l2 In short, she said, the
115. See id. at 273-74; see also id. at 256-57 (describing the flagging system used by
the Admissions Review Committee).
116. Id. at 273.
117. Id. at 274 n.21.
118. Id. at 275.
119. Id. at 276, 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 276-77.
121. Id. at 279. The Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court quoted this statement ap-
provingly in rebutting Justice Souter's contention that "applicants to the undergraduate col-
lege are [not] denied individualized consideration." Id. at 273 n.20 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The only potential source of individualized consideration appears to be the Admis-
sions Review Committee. [Yet, available evidence] reveals very little about how
the review committee actually functions. And what evidence there is indicates that
the committee is a kind of afterthought, rather than an integral component of a sys-
tem of individualized review.
Id. at 279-80.
123. Id. at 280.
[Vol. 42
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flagging system does little "to offset the apparent absence of individu-
alized consideration."'' 24
Justice Ginsburg dissented vigorously from the Court's opinion on
a multiplicity of substantive grounds. 25 These grounds included the
application of strict scrutiny in the case; 26 factors that in spite of the
introduction of a point-system rendered the affirmative action plan in
question narrowly tailored, individualized, and therefore constitu-
tional; 27 problems with so-called "race-neutral alternative[s]," such as
"percentage plans" under experimentation in states like California,
Florida, and Texas; 28 and, the necessity for full candor, not subter-
fuge, in affirmative action programs. 29
Regarding this last issue of honesty in affirmative programs, the
opinions of Justices Ginsburg and Souter are particularly important.
Justice Ginsburg remarked that in removing "[t]he stain of generations
of racial oppression ... in our society," institutions of higher learning
"will seek to maintain their minority enrollment." 30 The issue, she
said, is "whether... they can do so in full candor through.. . affirma-
tive action [programs such as] the [one] at issue" here.' Otherwise,
schools may resort to all kinds of "camouflage" designed to disguise
their use of race in admissions. 3 2 She expressed the view that "Michi-
gan's accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action
program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks,
nods, and disguises.""'3 Responding to Chief Justice Rehnquist's ac-
cusation that she suggested "changing the Constitution so that it con-
forms to the conduct of the universities,"'' 34 Justice Ginsburg main-
tained that, "the Constitution, properly interpreted, permits
government officials to respond openly to the continuing importance
of race. Among constitutionally permissible options, those that can-
didly disclose their consideration of race seem to me preferable to
those that conceal it.' ' 35
124. Id.
125. See id. at 298-305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 302-03.
127. See id. at 303.
128. Id. at 303 n.10.
129. Id. at 305.
130. Id. at 304.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also id. at 304-05 (describing examples of such camouflage or underhand
measures).
133. Id. at 305.
134. Id. at 275 n.22 (majority opinion).
135. Id. at 305 n.1 I (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
17
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In his dissent, Justice Souter contended "college admission is not
[something] left entirely to inarticulate intuition," numbers do not
automatically spell denial of individualized consideration, and "[t]he
college simply does by a numbered scale what the law school accom-
plishes [by] its 'holistic review."" 36  On the issue of candor, he was
satisfied that the affirmative action plan under challenge was "forth-
right[] in saying just what plus factor it gives [to race]" and "states its
purpose directly," compared to so-called race-neutral alternatives like
percentage plans, which are characterized by "deliberate obfusca-
tion."'37 "Equal protection cannot become an exercise in which the
winners are the ones who hide the ball."' 13 8 Therefore, Justice Souter
believed Michigan needed a pat on the back, not rebuke, "for its
frankness."' 13 9
C. Commentaries in Academic and Popular Media on the Case
Restrictions on affirmative action by the United States Supreme
Court, and a ban on the policy by some states, may have created anxi-
ety in pro-affirmative action quarters that the high court would use the
opportunity afforded by the challenges to the University of Michi-
gan's affirmative action programs to declare affirmative action uncon-
stitutional. 14° Whatever the reason, these cases, particularly Grutter
upholding affirmative action, have been received with considerable
applause in legal, educational, and civil rights quarters. The American
Bar Association (ABA) welcomed the Grutter decision as a "victory
for progress toward a legal profession that reflects the American soci-
136. Id. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 297-98.
138. Id. at 298.
139. Id.
140. See Norma M. Riccucci, The Immortality of Affirmative Action, in PUBLIC
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: CURRENT CONCERNS, FUTURE CHALLENGES 72, 73-79 (Carolyn
Ban & Norma M. Riccucci eds., 3d ed. 2002). Riccucci highlighted the series of decisions by
the federal courts, some of which, beginning with City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,
505 (1989) (holding a city ordinance that required a certain percentage of contracts to be
awarded to minorities violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), eroded affirmative action. Riccucci, supra, at 73-79. Two states wherein citizens have
adopted initiatives or referenda banning the use of race in education, employment, and gov-
ernment contracting are California and Washington. Id. at 79 (discussing a sample of voter
referenda, concluded and still ongoing, in the United States against affirmative action). For
example, the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), passed in 1996, ended thirty years of
affirmative action practice in the state. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 1, at 6. Other states,
such as Michigan, Nebraska, and Florida, are considering similar initiatives banning the use
of affirmative action. Riccucci, supra, at 79.
[Vol. 42
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ety it serves."' 141 The President of the Association of American Col-
leges and Universities (AACU) remarked, "The courts have recog-
nized that racial inequality still disfigures our democracy and that
higher education can and should play a crucial role in closing the op-
portunity gap."'142 The National Association of Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP) raved that the ruling "provided the nation with
a road map on how to construct affirmative action programs in higher
education."'' 43  Last, but not least, the National Urban League hailed
Grutter as "an historic victory for America and a reaffirmation of the
nation's commitment to equality and diversity."'"
Notable individuals who published commentaries in both popular
and scholastic media that praised the decision include Professor
Guinier of Harvard Law School, who called the case "a slam-dunk for
affirmative action"; 145 legal analyst Martin Michaelson, who opined
that "[n]ot since [Brown in] 1954 ... has the [Supreme C]ourt spoken
with one voice in a major ruling that affected race and education";1
141. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President (June
23, 2003), http://www.abanews.org/jun03/statement062303.htm.
142. Greg Winter, The Supreme Court: Other Campuses; Ruling Provides Relief but
Less than Hoped, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A26 (quoting AACU President Carol Geary
Schneider).
143. The Thin Race Line: Court Preserves Affirmative Action in Narrow Ruling, CHI.
TRIB., June 24, 2003, at 10 (quoting NAACP President Kweisi Mfume). The NAACP was
founded in 1909, "the hundredth anniversary of the birth of [President] Abraham Lincoln," as
an interracial organization "by upper-middle-class white Protestants and Jews." WALTON &
SMITH, supra note 1, at 95. It remained, until the 1960s, the principal civil rights protest or-
ganization. See id. The organization had a membership of about 450,000 people in 1700 lo-
cal chapters and an annual budget of about $11.9 million in 1995. Id. at 118. The NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the litigation arm of the organization, praised the case
as a "defining moment." Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Narrowly Upholds Af-
firmative Action for Diverse Student Bodies, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2003, at Cl (quoting Theo-
dore Shaw, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's associate director-counsel).
144. Urban League Applauds Court AA Ruling, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, July 2,
2003, at A5 (quoting National Urban League President Marc Morial) [hereinafter Urban
League Applauds AA Ruling]. The organization stated, "With this decision, the court [sic] has
made clear that diversity and excellence are not mutually exclusive." Id. Distinguishing
Grutter from Gratz, the National Urban League President noted, "[lt is extremely important
that citizens realize that the court [sic] did not reject affirmative action, it rejected Michigan's
specific scoring system." Id. The Urban League is designed to promote African American
economic advancement. Id. Founded in 1910, the organization has about 118 local affiliates
in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia and boasts an annual budget estimated at $24
million in 1995. Id.; WALTON & SMITH, supra note 1, at 117-18.
145. Guinier, supra note 15.
146. Martin Michaelson, The Court's Pronouncements Are More Dramatic and Subtle
than the Headlines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 18, 2003, at 11.
19
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and university administrator M. Lee Pelton, who hailed the case as a
"summer blockbuster ruling on ... affirmative action." '147
Not all analysts who commented on the decision believed it
marked an auspicious development in Supreme Court jurisprudence
on affirmative action. Critics of the decision may be classified as in-
dividuals who assessed the decision as going too far and those who
viewed it as not going far enough. Among the category of individuals
who thought the decision went too far are Professor Shelby Steele and
Ward Connerly. Steele, a black conservative, lambasted Grutter as
"A Victory for White Guilt," maintaining, "We deserve justices who
can feel certain about the capacity of whites to be fair and the capacity
of minorities to compete."'48 Connerly, a black, reputed for his stout
opposition to affirmative action, berated the Grutter ruling as a
"Cloudy Vision of a Race-Free America."' 14 9
Commentators who viewed the decision as not going far enough
include distinguished educator and veteran commentator on African
American affairs, Professor Ron Walters, and newspaper writer Der-
rick Z. Jackson. Professor Walters assessed Grutter merely as "a stay
of execution to affirmative action."'50 He stated he would "hold [his]
applause - or maybe applaud lightly" and viewed any "victory dance"
as premature, given that "[w]hat the court [sic] did was to constitu-
tionalize the concept of diversity as an appropriate basis for the prac-
tice of affirmative action."'' He condemned the role of the Bush ad-
147. M. Lee Pelton, Affirmative Action and Democratic Vistas: After the Supreme Court
Michigan Cases, 6 PRESIDENCY 18 (Fall 2003), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/nfiKqa3839/is_200310/ain9329676. Pelton is the president of Willamette University.
Id.
148. Shelby Steele, Op-Ed., A Victory for White Guilt, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at
A16. For a discussion on the identity and ideology of the new black conservatives, see
Lucius J. BARKER ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 98-101
(4th ed. 1999). The group also includes Justice Clarence Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Id. at 101.
149. Ward Connerly, The Cloudy Vision of a Race-Free America, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 4, 2003, at B12. Connerly regrettably stated, "While I and many
others viewed Michigan's reasoning about diversity as the snow job of the century, the court
[sic] saw otherwise and elevated Justice Lewis Powell's dictum in the Bakke case to the law
of the land." Id. Connerly serves on the governing board of the University of California and
is one of the architects of the CCRI, a measure approved by the voters of California in 1996,
that forbids the use of race, gender, or ethnicity as criteria in state hiring and admissions to
public universities. Id.; Riccucci, supra note 140, at 79.
150. Ron Walters, Op-Ed., Affirmative Action Wins: But Which Version?, SACRAMENTO




California Western Law Review, Vol. 42 [2005], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol42/iss1/2
2005] IMPACT OF GRUTTER ON USE OF RACE IN LAW SCHOOLS 21
ministration in the Michigan cases. 152  Jackson opined that Grutter
meant "affirmative action survived, but in a form more limited than
ever and with [Justice Sandra Day] O'Connor setting the nation's
timer to get rid of it by 2028.' ' m
III. OVERVIEW OF MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN AMERICA
The story of minority participation in the American legal profes-
sion is a story of exclusion. One of the significant changes in the legal
profession during the 1970s and 1980s was the "gradual and belated
opening to minority lawyers and multicultural diversity." 154  Before
this period, minority participation in the legal profession was mini-
mal. 155
To date, the experience of blacks, as a group vastly under-
represented in law school relative to their share of the population,
symptomatizes the historic plight of minority lawyers.'56 Before the
1970s and 1980s, few white law schools admitted blacks. 157 As a re-
152. See Ron Walters, Editorial, The Michigan Affirmative Action Case and Black Pa-
triotism, N.Y. BEACON, May 21, 2003, at 8. He berated the "crowd in the [Bush] White
House" as "especially callous" and pointed to the actions of the government as "one powerful
reason why" blacks generally maintain a lukewarm attitude toward the war in Iraq. Id.
They are not sure they are full Americans because they [are] faced with the hard
evidence that while [they] always have been willing to fight and die for [Amer-
ica]-and to prove [themselves] worthy citizens-this country was not always
willing to exhibit the full measure of devotion to [them].
Id.
153. Derrick Z. Jackson, Editorial, Taking on the Bonus Points for Whites, CHI. TRIB.,
June 30, 2003, at C19. Although this piece also discussed Grutter, its main focus, as even the
article's very caption bears out, was on Gratz, regarding which Jackson contended: "Getting
rid of a point system may sound fine to someone who refuses to open a history book." Id.
"The court took away bonus points for black, brown, and red people on behalf of angry white
people. But the bonus points of white privilege are still in place, unchallenged and unrelent-
ing, no matter how angry minorities get." Id
154. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 23 (1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. The report is sometimes referred to as the MacCrate Re-
port, after Robert MacCrate, who chaired the Task Force. See id. at v.
155. See id. at 23.
156. See generally Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in
Law Schools: Forward to the Past?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 415, 416 (1986) (examining
black law school "enrollment patterns and explanations for [those patterns] in three periods:
(1) the century following the enrollment of the first black law student in 1868; (2) the decade
of substantial growth in black enrollment; and (3) the leveling off in black enrollment during
the late 1970s and 1980s"). It found that even "[a]t the highest point, blacks constituted about
five percent of law students," a number, the authors, for good reason, term "minuscule." Id.
at 415.
157. See id. at 428.
21
Aka: Assessing the Impact in Grutter on the Use of Race in Law School
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
suit, for a long time, the main source of black legal education was his-
torically black law schools like Howard University Law School in
Washington, D.C.; North Carolina Central University Law School,
founded in 1939; and Texas Southern University, Houston, and South-
ern University Law School in Baton Rouge, both established in
1947.158 Howard University Law School opened its doors in 1869 and
until 1939 was the only substantial school in the entire country blacks
could attend for legal education.'59 This included future Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was compelled to attend How-
ard University Law School after he was denied admission into the
University of Maryland Law School in the 1940s because of his
race.' 6° As late as 1983, these four law schools "trained the majority
of black lawyers." 161
In addition to not being admitted by white law schools, blacks
were also "expressly excluded from membership in the [ABA].' 62
158. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 23.
159. Id.
160. Leland Ware, Turning Back the Clock: The Assault on Affirmative Action, 54
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 29 n.45 (1998).
161. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 23.
162. Shields, supra note 19, at 752 n.9. Founded in 1878, the ABA is the largest na-
tional organization of attorneys in the United States. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS
TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS: RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2005-2006 iv (2005-06 ed. 2005), available at
www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2005-2006standardsbook.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF
PROCEDURE]; see also Am. Bar Ass'n, About the ABA, http://www.abanet.org/about/
home/html (last visited Oct. 7, 2005). Seventy-five lawyers from twenty-one states and the
District of Columbia attended the ABA's organizational meeting of the association in Sara-
toga, New York in 1878. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 105-06 n. 14. The meeting's
principal organizer was Judge Simeon E. Baldwin of Yale Law School and later Chief Justice
and Governor of Connecticut. Id. at 107. The ABA is "designed to raise the standards of the
legal profession and to encourage professional unity." See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL,
INC., THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 4 (2001 ed. 2000) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
GUIDE 2001 ED.].The organization
sponsors ... programs dealing with legal education, law reform, judicial selection,
and professional responsibility. [It] publishes the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, a set of regulations governing ethical standards in the practice of law.
Attorneys who violate [these] standards are [then] subject to censure, suspension,
or disbarment by the state bar admitting authorities.
Id.
One critical ABA division is the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). The Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar is the section of the ABA that works with the Law School Admis-
sion Council in preparing and publishing the Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools
released annually. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED
LAW SCHOOLS i (2002 ed. 2001) [hereinafter OFFICIAL GUIDE 2002 ED.]. The Section origi-
nated in 1879 as the Standing Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURE, supra note 162, at iv. It gained free-standing status as a section,
the first established by the ABA, in 1893. Id. Since 1952, the Council of the Section of Legal
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The ban remained in place until 1943 when it was formally lifted.'63
Even then, it took seven years, until 1950, for "the first African
American lawyer [to be] admitted [in]to the Association."'" The few
blacks who graduated from law school before 1943 joined the Na-
tional Bar Association, the national association of black lawyers.165
Since its formation in 1925, the organization "has been continuously
concerned [about] the dearth of black lawyers in proportion to the
[size of the] African American population."'"
To combat the exclusion of blacks from historically white law
schools, beginning in the 1930s, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
under Thurgood Marshall and others, brought suits designed to open
the doors of these schools to blacks. 167 These discrimination cases in-
cluded Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, which invalidated Mis-
souri's policy of excluding blacks from its law school and instead of-
fering to pay for their attendance at out-of-state law schools; 168 and
Sweatt v. Painter, which found that Texas's all-black law school was
Education and Admissions to the Bar, not the ABA itself, has been approved by the U.S. De-
partment of Education as the recognized national agency for the accreditation of professional
schools of law. Id. The ABA announced its first Standards for Legal Education in 1921. Id.
To enforce these standards for law schools which met them, the ABA, in 1927, hired Profes-
sor H. Claude Horack of the University of Iowa College of Law as its first Advisor to the Sec-
tion. Id. Starting with Professor Millard H. Ruud of the University of Texas, the job title
changed to Consultant on Legal Education to the American Bar Association in recognition of
the broader responsibilities of the position. Id. After Ruud, Professor (later Dean) James P.
White of Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis became the Consultant on Legal
Education beginning in January 1974. Id. White left the position in August 2000 and was
replaced by John A. Sebert who has been in office since September 1, 2000. Id. Sebert was a
former Dean of the University of Baltimore School of Law and a former law professor at both
the University of Tennessee and University of Minnesota law schools. Id.
163. Shields, supra note 19, at 752 n.9.
164. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 23.
165. Id. at 25; see also Shields, supra note 19, at 732.
166. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 25.
167. WALTON & SMITH, supra note 1, at 210-11, 213; see also Littlejohn & Rubinowitz,
supra note 156, at 429. In its war against "separate but equal," the NAACP adopted a two-
prong strategy that initially involved an attack focused on "the absence of equality in the edu-
cation of blacks." WALTON & SMITH, supra note 1, at 210. Following these and other victo-
ries, the organization, after extensive study, changed its strategy and launched a direct and
frontal attack on the practice of segregation symbolized by separate but equal, resulting in
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. Id. at 213. The deluge of studies chronicling the
NAACP's "fighting segregation through litigation" strategy include JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Vintage Books ed.
1977) (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
168. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938).
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inherently inferior to its school for whites and ordered the admission
of blacks to the white law school. 169 Yet, it was
not until . . . Brown v. Board of Education overruling the "separate but
equal" doctrine, and the [series] of civil rights legislation [enacted] in the
early 1960s, [that] the academic legal community [started] to give serious
attention to the problem of the exclusion of blacks and other racial minori-
ties from law schools. 170
Moreover, it was not until 1964 that the Committee on Racial
Discrimination of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
could report "for the first time that no member school [stated that it]
den[ied] admission to any applicant [based] on... race or color."'71
Even with the AALS's report that no member law school was dis-
criminating, in the 1964-65 academic year, only 433 of the over
50,000 law students enrolled in predominantly white law schools were
African Americans. 72  The overall number of blacks in ABA-
accredited law schools in 1965, with a majority of black or white stu-
dents, was only 700 or approximately one percent of all enrollments in
J.D. programs. 173 The number rose to 4423, making up 4.3% of all en-
rollments in 1972; and 8149, comprising 6.3% of all enrollments in
the 1991-92 academic year. 174 It took the coordinated efforts of law
schools, the organized bar, and federal government agencies, all de-
signed to increase minority enrollment, to realize the very modest
progress articulated here.175 One such federal agency was the Office
of Economic Opportunity, which, in the late 1960s, "initiated pro-
grams of increased financial aid and remedial study." 176 Beginning in
the early 1970s, "the office of the ABA Consultant on Legal Educa-
tion [started to] include[] in [its] Annual Review of Legal Education a
survey of minority group students enrolled in J.D. programs in ap-
proved law schools."' 177 The Law School Admission Council (LSAC)
was "[tihe first national legal education organization to gather minor-
169. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34, 636 (1950).
170. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 23. The legislation included the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Right Acts of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
WALTON & SMITH, supra note 1, at 177, 179.
171. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 23. AALS was founded in 1900 with
thirty-two charter member schools. Id. at 107. Membership is open to schools, which are re-
quired to meet certain minimum standards, rather than to individuals. Id.
172. Id. at 23-24.
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ity law school enrollment data."'78 The initiative was endorsed and
supported by the AALS and the Council on Legal Education Opportu-
nity (CLEO). 79
The minimal or token representation of blacks in the American le-
gal profession also was noticeable in the number of minority individu-
als engaged in legal practice. 10 For example, in 1960, there were only
2012 black lawyers, or 0.98% of the 205,515 lawyers and judges in
the United States. 8' By 1970, the number grew slightly to 3728, or
1.4% out of a total 272,401 lawyers and judges. 82 By 1980, the num-
ber of black lawyers and judges increased to 14,839 and further in-
creased to 25,704 in 1990, totaling 2.7% and 3.3% of all American
lawyers and judges, respectively. 183 These modest changes would not
have taken place but for the "increased political activity and the dis-
178. Id. at 24 n.42 (quoting Millard H. Ruud). The LSAC is a nonprofit corporation
founded in 1947 "to coordinate, facilitate, and enhance the law school admission process."
OFFICIAL GUIDE 2002 ED., supra note 162, at i. The Council "provides numerous programs
and services related to legal education." Id. All ABA-approved law schools are LSAC mem-
bers. Id. With the help of the ABA, LSAC produces the Official Guide to ABA-Approved
Law Schools. Id. This is a guidebook published yearly, embodying statistics on the 183
ABA-approved law schools in the country as of 2001. Id. It is designed "to help individuals
prepare for the rigors and costs associated with attending law school." Id. The 2001 guide
calls itself "a resource book for individuals seeking broad information about law school in
general." OFFICIAL GUIDE 2001 ED., supra note 162, at i. The language "broad information
about law school in general" is appropriate and revealing. As the LSAC explains, no singular
guidebook
can rightly claim to be a final authority on the many questions that the law school
applicant will encounter. Whether you are choosing a school, selecting courses or
other activities, or investigating career opportunities, [the decision] in the final
analysis, will be yours alone to make .... Regarding various aspects of legal edu-
cation, there is no single school of thought, but rather ongoing, vigorous discussion
of numerous important issues.
Id. It warns that no singular "book or website can substitute for direct contact with admission
offices, professors, students, alumni, and prelaw advisors." OFFICIAL GUIDE 2002 ED., supra
note 162, at i. The overriding point, as the [SAC counsels, is for law school applicants to
"seek information from as many sources as possible, particularly from the law schools them-
selves." OFFICIAL GUIDE 2001 ED., supra note 162, at i. The [SAC advises minority appli-
cants on the imperativeness "to do sufficient research and be selective." OFFICIAL GUIDE
2002 ED., supra note 162, at 24. Information contained in the guide is collected from ABA-
approved schools in the fall of every year. Id. at i. ABA rules mandate that a law school
"publish basic consumer information" and that the information "be published in a fair and ac-
curate manner reflective of actual practice." Id. (quoting STANDARDS OF PROCEDURE, supra
note 162, § 509). "The ABA collects quantitative data as part of the accreditation process [for
law schools,] using questionnaires completed annually during the fall academic semester."
Id.
179. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 24 n.42.
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mantling of racial segregation" that occurred during the decades of the
1970s and 1980s."8
Despite significant progress made over the years by law schools
and the organized bar, among others, in increasing minority participa-
tion, minority groups still maintain a representation in the American
legal profession at numbers well below their share of the popula-
tion.185 In 1990, blacks made up only 3.3% percent of all U.S. law-
yers, almost nine percentage points below their share of thirty million
people, or 12.1% of the population. 18 6 In 2000, ten years later, the
number climbed to only 3.9% of U.S. lawyers. 117 In the same, year,
Hispanics made up an estimated 12.5% of the U.S. population but ac-
counted for only 3.3% of U.S. lawyers, more than nine percentage
points below their share of the population.188 These figures stood in
sharp contrast with Asians who made up 3.6% of the population but
accounted for 2.3% of American lawyers (a mere 1.3% below their
share of the population) and whites who made up 75.1% of the U.S.
population but accounted for 89.2% of the country's lawyers.189
Whites had more lawyers than their share of the population by a sub-
stantial amount of more than fourteen percentage points.' 90
The Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession,
also known as the MacCrate Report, assessed that "[t]he law schools
and the organized bar were slow to recognize their essential role and
responsibility for promoting equal justice for racial minorities."19'
While barriers have been broken and exclusionary policies abandoned,
"[t]he goal of equal opportunity within the [legal] profession is still a
long way from realization." 192 It is in this understandable vein that the
MacCrate Report rated the diversification and opening of education to
blacks and other minorities in the United States as "belated." 193 Al-




187. COMM'N ON RACIAL & ETHIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS'N,
STATISTICS ABOUT MINORITIES IN THE PROFESSION FROM THE CENSUS (2005), available at
www.abanet.org/minorities/links/2000census.htm [hereinafter STATISTICS ABOUT
MINORITIES]; see also Molly McDonough, A Long March: Report Says the Legal Profession's
Efforts to Achieve Diversity Still Are at a Crawl, 91 A.B.A. J. 59,59 (2005).
188. STATISTICS ABOUT MINORITIES, supra note 187; see also McDonough, supra note
187, at 59.
189. STATISTICS ABOUT MINORITIES, supra note 187.
190. See id.
191. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 27.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 23.
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private practice, corporations, government service, teaching, and ad-
ministration continues to grow, this is "only a beginning" that needs to
be creatively built upon. 194
A recent study by the ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Di-
versity in the Profession (CRED), instructively titled Miles to Go:
Progress of Minorities in the Legal Profession, reinforces this assess-
ment of a slow pace regarding minority participation in the American
legal profession. 95 It reports that "[m]inorities continue to be grossly
underrepresented in the top ranks of the profession, such as firm part-
ners and corporate general counsel[s].' 196 Also, "progress in the pro-
fession has been especially slow for minority women."'1 97 According
to the study, the legal profession "continue[s] to trail ... other [major]
professions in terms of minority representation .... [M]inorities make
up 20.8 percent of accountants and auditors, 24.6 percent of physi-
cians and surgeons, and 18.2 percent of college and university teach-
ers." 198 For lawyers, the number is only 9.7 percent. 199 However,
some statistics in the report give hope. For example, "minorities ac-
count for 20.3 percent of law students, 14.5 percent of law firm asso-
ciates and 4 percent of partners." 2°° But, as one of the authors of the
study stated, "[m]inority progress in the profession remains frustrat-
ingly low."20 1
To improve minority participation in the legal profession, "[t]he
report urge[d] law schools to develop holistic approaches to admis-
sions" and not to over-rely on the law school admission test (LSAT)
scores, which it said "are a 'weak predictor' of success [in law school]
and put minorities at a disadvantage. '"2 2 It counseled law firms and
other legal employers to "include diversity in their business plans" and
for the lawyers who run the firms to enforce those plans.20 3 It also
"recommend[ed] more systematic research to better measure patterns
194. Id. at 26-27.






201. Id. (quoting Professor Elizabeth Chambliss of the New York Law School in Man-
hattan). Part of the reason is that minority enrollment in law schools may have leveled out.
Id. "Minority enrollment actually dropped slightly, from 20.6 percent of all law students in
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of diversity within the profession. ' '2 4 The chair of CRED observed,
"The elections of Robert J. Grey Jr. and Dennis W. Archer as the first
two African-Americans to serve as ABA president are notable," but at
the same time he worried
that lawyers will celebrate these achievements without also recognizing
that much still needs to be done [before] the legal profession . . .
achieve[s] full diversity.
'People think it's time to relax,' [he said]. '[But w]e can't let up.
We've got to continue the drumbeat . . . Those victories show us what
can be done, not the measure of what has been done." 205
The authors of the report indicated that "[a]t some level, lawyers
must make a personal commitment to greater diversity in the profes-
sion through mentoring and other activities .... 'All of us as lawyers
need to look at it and ask what can we do to make a difference.' 2°
IV. INFLUENCE OF RACE IN LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS IN AMERICA
"[L]aw schools are the gateway to the legal profession. ' 20 7 In the
American education system, they are indispensable purveyors of
"minimum requirements designed, developed, and implemented for
the purpose of advancing the basic goal of providing a sound program
of legal education. ' 20 8  The exclusion of blacks and other minorities
from American legal education in the past, resulting in their vast un-
der-representation relative to their share of the population, 2° dictated
that race had to be taken into account in law school admissions deci-
sion making.
A. The Supreme Court: From Correction of Black Exclusion to an
Option for the Use of Race in Admissions Decisions as a Tool of
Inclusiveness
With its rulings in the past, the Supreme Court contributed to
black exclusion and segregation.210 Possibly for this reason, the Court
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Lawrence R. Baca, chair of the ABA Commission on Racial and Eth-
nic Diversity in the Profession) (second omission in original).
206. Id. (quoting Lawrence R. Baca, chair of the ABA Commission on Racial and Eth-
nic Diversity in the Profession).
207. STANDARDS OF PROCEDURE, supra note 162, at viii.
208. Id.
209. See STATISTICS ABOUT MINORITIES, supra note 187.
210. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (announcing the "separate
but equal" doctrine); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9-10, 32 (1883) (invaliding the Sec-
[Vol. 42
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recognized early in the game that race could be a factor in admissions
decisions. In Brown, issued in 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that
"segregati[ng] ...children in public schools solely [based on their]
race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors
may be equal, deprive[d minority] children of. . .equal educational
opportunities," contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 ' The decision abolished the "separate but equal"
doctrine in Plessy and desegregated the public school system.21 2 In a
companion case involving the District of Columbia, the Court ruled
that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children
of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary dep-
rivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. 21 3
The Court reached its decision in Brown unanimously with no justice
dissenting.214 Insightful analysis on "public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation" informed the holding in Brown.2"5 The Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his envi-
ronment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be available to all on equal terms.2 16
Several key cases, most of them directly related to the law school
context, led up to Brown. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the
Court ruled that equal protection under the Constitution mandated
Missouri to provide separate but equal legal education facilities for
ond Civil Rights Act of 1875 which made it a federal crime to deny blacks full enjoyment of
public accommodation); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406, 428 (1856) (holding that black
slaves were not citizens of the United States and holding that the Missouri Compromise,
which banned slavery in parts of the United States, was unconstitutional).
211. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493,495 (1954).
212. Id. at 495.
213. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
214. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
215. Id. at 492-93.
216. Id. at 493.
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blacks.1 7 Since Missouri could not provide separate but equal legal
education for Gaines, a black applicant who was refused admission to
the University of Missouri Law School because of his race, Missouri
had to admit him to the University of Missouri Law School. 218 The
Court found untenable Missouri's defense that it would pay Gaines's
tuition to an out-of-state law school pending the establishment of a
separate law school for blacks.2t 9
In Sweatt v. Painter, the University of Texas Law School (UTLS)
denied Marion Sweatt, a black applicant, admission to the law school
based on his race. 2 0 During Sweatt's lawsuit to gain admission to
UTLS, Texas hastily constructed an alleged separate but equal law
school for blacks.21 In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Vinson,
the Court found no "substantial equality in the educational opportuni-
ties" Texas offered to black law students, compared to the opportuni-
ties it provided to whites, and ruled that Sweatt must be admitted into
the UTLS.222
The case involved a challenge to a provision of the Texas Consti-
tution that allowed the University of Texas to be reserved for white
students.223 Besides listing the many tangible and intangible features
which importantly distinguished the UTLS from the hastily set-up law
school for blacks, the Court also advised that a law school "cannot be
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which
the law interacts. '224 It noted, obviously regrettably, that the newly es-
tablished law school for blacks "excludes from its student body mem-
bers of the racial groups which number 85% of the population of the
State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and
other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when
he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. '2 25
In Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, decided
two years before Sweatt, the Supreme Court ruled that the State of
Oklahoma must provide legal education for the petitioner, a black
woman, "in conformity with the equal protection clause.., and pro-
217. Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
218. Id. at 352.
219. Id. at 351-52.
220. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950).
221. Id. at 632-33.
222. Id. at 633, 636.
223. Id. at 631 n.1.
224. Id. at 632-34.
225. Id. at 634.
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vide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. "226 Finally,
in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, a black
student was admitted to the University of Oklahoma Graduate School
of Education, but was required to sit in a roped-off section away from
white students and in a separate area of the library and cafeteria.227 In
a decision, again authored by Chief Justice Vinson, the Supreme Court
found that the "restrictions impair[ed] ... [the petitioner's] ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other stu-
dents, and, in general, to learn his profession.
228
Although these cases were part of the NAACP's "fighting segre-
gation through litigation" plan of attack, designed to combat the ex-
clusion of blacks from predominantly white law schools, 22 9 the Su-
preme Court deserves credit for the rulings. The NAACP and black
civil rights activists brought the cases, but the opinions themselves
were handed down by the Court, not by these activists.
Most recently in Grutter, the Supreme Court re-embraced the rule
of inclusiveness it laid down in Brown to the effect that educational
"opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. "23 ° The Court
said, "Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must
be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may par-
ticipate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America." '231 Justice O'Connor,
who authored the opinion of the Court, contended that "the diffusion
of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or
ethnicity."232  For support, she cleverly cited the concession of the
U.S. government, embodied in its amicus brief opposing race-
conscious programs, that "[e]nsuring that public institutions are open
and available to all segments of American society, including people of
all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government objec-
226. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (per cu-
riam).
227. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1950).
The University admitted McLaurin while his suit was pending. Id. at 640.
228. Id. at 641.
229. WALTON & SMITH, supra note 1, at 213.
230. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
231. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003).
232. Id. at 331.
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tive. ' '233 She also cited the Brown proposition that education is "the
very foundation of good citizenship" 234 and argued that elite public
educational institutions like the University of Michigan form "the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders. 235 She
maintained that "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized; '236 adding that "to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is neces-
sary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and quali-
fied individuals of every race and ethnicity. 237
From the position that segregation and exclusion violated consti-
tutional provisions of equal protection, the Supreme Court moved in
due course to embrace support for race-conscious programs as an in-
dispensable tool for inclusiveness. This was the situation in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, as well as in the two Michi-
gan cases. In Bakke, the Court upheld affirmative action under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but struck down its operation by the Univer-
sity of California because the university maintained a set-aside pro-
gram that the Court found to be an unconstitutional quota.238 As Jus-
tice O'Connor clarified in Grutter, a quarter century later, "[t]he only
holding for the Court in Bakke was that a 'State has a substantial in-
terest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admis-
sions program involving the competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin.' '2 39 Bakke stood for the famous proposition embodied
in the opinion of Justice Powell, that race could be used as a "plus"
factor among other factors, rather than as a sole criterion, to promote
diversity of a public school student body.24 In Bakke, five Justices,
including Justice Powell, accepted the use of race in admissions deci-
sions.24 By the time of the Michigan cases in 2003, the number grew
233. Id. at 331-32 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
234. Id. at 331 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
235. Id. at 332.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978).
239. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
240. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
241. Id. at 268. In addition to Justice Powell, the four Justices that would uphold the
use of race were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and White. Id. These four Justices
would have upheld the affirmative action plan under challenge against all attack on the
ground that the government can use race "to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past
racial prejudice." Id. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four other Justices, Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
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to seven. With the exception of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, all
members of the Rehnquist Court, including the Chief Justice himself,
supported the use of race to promote diversity as long as the use of
race met strict scrutiny.24
2
B. The Use of Race in Law School Admissions Decisions by Law
Schools and Legal Organizations
As one commentator points out, "[m]ost Americans detest racial
and ethnic preferences. People (we think) should advance on individ-
ual effort and merit. But most Americans also don't want a closed so-
ciety and recognize that past discrimination, particularly slavery and
segregation, leave a heavy legacy."243 Those "most Americans," be-
sides the Supreme Court, who recognize that past discrimination
leaves a heavy legacy, and therefore approve of the use of race in law
school admissions decisions, include law schools and legal organiza-
tions.
Law schools consider applicants as individuals, 24 but they also
take into account the ethnic and racial backgrounds of those individu-
als.245 Put differently, law schools consider all aspects of a candi-
date's application, including racial background. 24 The LSAC, the or-
tices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart, would not uphold the program, not on constitutional
grounds, but, intriguingly, rather based on the ground only that it violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 408, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). Bakke produced six separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority
of the Court. See id. at 268 (majority opinion). Justice Powell provided a fifth vote both for
invalidating the special admissions program under review and for taking race into account in
admissions decisions to promote diversity. See id. at 319-20.
242. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding that the University of Michigan Law
School's use of race in admissions was admissible; the majority opinion was joined by Jus-
tices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); see also id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (agreeing with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke allowing the use of race in admis-
sions decisions but dissenting from the majority's application of strict scrutiny); id. at 386
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (maintaining that the use of race in admissions decisions must
meet strict scrutiny which the University of Michigan Law School's plan failed to do); id. at
349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('The Constitution proscribes gov-
ernment discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.");
id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the use of race
in admissions decisions is unconstitutional racial discrimination).
243. Robert Samuelson, Solving 'Affirmative Ambiguity': Despite Its Flaws, Affirmative
Action Remains One of the Crude Devices by Which America Tries to Be More Open, CHI.
TRIB., June 20, 2003, at C25. Samuelson commented that "[d]espite its many flaws, affirma-
tive action remains one of the crude devices by which America tries to become more open."
Id.
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ganization charged with responsibility for coordinating law school
admissions, 47 includes "ethnic/racial background" along with "indi-
vidual character and personality" among the criteria that may be con-
sidered by law school admission committees.248 LSAC advises minor-
ity applicants, "It is to your advantage to include information on your
racial or ethnic identity (even if not requested on the application);
such information helps to present a complete picture of you."249 The
list of factors the LSAC indicates that law schools consider also in-
cludes difficulties an individual faced and overcame to reach law
school, including socioeconomic circumstances.250 As the LSAC
guidebook for 2002 states, "Law schools want diverse, interesting
classes, representative of a variety of backgrounds. '251 A rewarding
legal education is one where the student is challenged by class-
mates.252 The guidebook also explains that diversity is an important
aspect of a student's law school educational experience because "dif-
ferences among students will expose [the individual] to various points
of view. '253  Diversity is not limited to the student body, but rather
also encompasses law faculty. 254 The guidebook explains that a di-
verse faculty "will have various points of view and experiences ...
[that] enrich [students'] legal education, broaden [their] ... point[s] of
view, and help prepare [them] for the variety of clients [they] will
work with after [they leave] law school. 255
Given this strong commitment to diversity, it is not surprising that
an important recent study by a top employee of the LSAC, looking at
data for law school applications and admissions in the 1990-91 aca-
demic year, found "widespread use of affirmative action admission
practices in legal education. '256 Further support for the use of race in
247. Id. at i.
248. Id. at 10.
249. Id. at 24. See also id at 25-34 (including key facts for minority law school appli-
cants in the guide's discussion on "Opportunities in Law for Minority Men and Women").
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 12.
252. Id. at 20.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 21.
255. Id.
256. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission De-
cisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1997). Professor Wightman was Vice President for Testing,
Operations, and Research at the LSAC when the research for this Article was conducted. Id.
at 1 n.a. The opinions expressed in the piece customarily were said to be those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of the [SAC. Id. However, the piece extensively cited
several previous research studies dating back to 1990 that the author conducted for the LSAC.
See id. at 5 n.ll, 13 n.30, 24 n.51, 30 nn.63-64.
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admissions decisions is evidenced by the amici curiae briefs filed on
behalf of the university. For example, the American Law Deans As-
sociation authored a brief supporting the University of Michigan Law
School in the Grutter case.2 57  Additional supporters included the
AALS, 58 Society of American Law Teachers,259 and the Clinical Le-
gal Education Association.260  Law schools which submitted briefs
supporting the use of race in law school admissions included Arizona
State University College of Law,26' Howard University,262 and Indiana
University. 263
Along with law schools, the ABA supports the use of race in deci-
sion making relating to admissions into law schools.264 To rectify past
exclusion and ameliorate the vast under-representation of blacks and
other minorities that has come to bedevil U.S. legal education, this
premier national organization of lawyers has, since 1980, adopted a
policy requiring law schools to provide equal opportunities to minori-
ties. 265  Together with the AALS, the ABA also has "a law school
standard [that] call[s] for specific commitments to provide full oppor-
tunities [in legal education] for . . . minorit[ies]. '266 As part of this
commitment to the use of race in law school admissions, the ABA
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar indicated that
"an approved law school must provide an opportunity for its students
257. Brief for American Law Deans Association as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399070. The Asso-
ciation was represented by Douglas Laycock. Id.
258. Brief for Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399076. The
organization was represented by Pamela S. Karlan. Id.
259. Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399060. The
organization was represented by Michael Selmi. Id.
260. Brief for Clinical Legal Education Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 536754. The
organization was represented by Timothy A. Nelsen. Id.
261. Brief for the Arizona State University College of Law as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398328.
The law school was represented by Ralph S. Spritzer and Paul Bender. Id.
262. Brief for Howard University as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 367213. The university was repre-
sented by Janell M. Byrd. Id.
263. Brief for Indiana University as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2002 U.S. Briefs 241. The university was rep-
resented by James Fitzpatrick, Lauren K Robel, and Jeffrey Evans Stake. Id.
264. See Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2002 U.S. Briefs 241 [herein-
after ABA Brief].
265. Id. at 2; see also STANDARDS OF PROCEDURE, supra note 162, at 24.
266. OFFICIAL GUIDE 2002 ED., supra note 162, at 24.
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to study in a diverse educational environment. '267 The ABA does not
support abandoning race and ethnicity in law school admissions deci-
sions and maintains that abandoning race would result in decreased
access by blacks and other minorities to legal education. 268 The or-
ganization was among the groups that submitted friend-of-the-court
briefs supporting the University of Michigan Law School race-
conscious program in Grutter.269
Last, but not least, of the legal organizations supporting the use of
race in law school admissions is the LSAC.270 The organization pre-
sented an amicus curiae brief supporting affirmative action and the
University of Michigan Law School's program in Grutter.271 LSAC
assessed that "[a]lthough minority participation in law school and the
legal profession has increased over the last three decades," individual
law schools and legal organizations can do more "to attract mi-
norit[ies] ... to the profession" and to counteract "the historic short-
age of minority lawyers. '"272 It opined, 'The legal profession is cogni-
zant of the minority exclusion and underrepresentation that has
historically pervaded American society. ' 273 It stated, "The legal sys-
tem . . . greatly values and benefits from multicultural perspectives,
[and that it] acknowledges the importance of diverse legal representa-
tion. ' 2 74 To promote its commitment to the use of race in law school
admissions, the LSAC formed the Minority Affairs Committee that
has spent over "$3 million on projects designed to increase the num-
ber of minorit[ies] . . . who attend law schools. '275 In its zeal to in-
crease minority participation in American legal education, the LSAC
267. STANDARDS OF PROCEDURE, supra note 162, at viii.
268. ABA Brief, supra note 264, at 20.
269. Id. The organization was represented by A. P. Carlton. Id. Non-national or re-
gional legal groups which submitted briefs supporting affirmative action and the University of
Michigan Law School's program included the Black Women Lawyers Association of Greater
Chicago, Inc., represented by Sharon E. Jones, Brief for the Black Women Lawyers Associa-
tion of Greater Chicago, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2002 U.S. Briefs 241, and the Boston Bar Association,
represented by Thomas E. Dwyer, Jr., Brief of the Boston Bar Association et al. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
2002 U.S. Briefs 241.
270. Brief for the Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399229. LSAC
was represented by Walter Dellinger. Id
271. Id.
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reminds minority persons to realize "that law can be a rewarding and
fulfilling career. 27
6
C. World Without Race: Consequences for Minority Participation in
Legal Education Arising from Abandonment of Race in Law School
Admissions Decisions
A counterintuitive way to look at the role of race in law school
admissions decisions is to consider the consequences of its abolition
or abandonment as a factor in decisions on minority enrollment in law
schools. The consequences will be direly hurtful for minorities. 277
This is an issue that from the very inception of the "affirmative action
debate" has engaged the thoughts of scholars.278 In an article pub-
lished in 1970, Professor Clyde W. Summers attempted to show how
preferential admissions constituted "an unreal solution" to the real
problem of what to do about increasing minority presence in the
American legal profession.279 Summers argued that a policy based on
race does not substantially increase the total number of minority law
students. 280  Summers maintained that race-based programs simply
shift minority students from those law schools popularly perceived as
less prestigious to those perceived as more prestigious.28" ' "[E]ach law
school, by its preferential admission, simply takes minority students
away from other schools whose admission standards are further down
the scale. 282 He contended that minority applicants, who were admit-
ted to one or more highly selective schools as a result of preferential
admission decisions, most likely would have gained admission to a
less selective school without the need for affirmative action pro-
grams. 283
A systematic analysis of empirical data by Professor Linda F.
Wightman could not find any support for Summers's hypothesis.2 84
Professor Wightman's study appeared in the aftermath of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Hopwood v. Texas, which struck
down the affirmative action program of the University of Texas at
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., Wightman, supra note 256, at 15-16.
278. See generally THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE (George E. Curry ed., 1996).
279. Clyde W. Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Prob-
lem, 1970 U. ToL. L. REv. 377, 377 (1970).




284. See Wightman, supra note 256, at 22-23.
37
Aka: Assessing the Impact in Grutter on the Use of Race in Law School
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Austin and questioned Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.285 Wight-
man found that the use of race increased access for minority appli-
cants, rather than simply shifting minority applicants from less pres-
tigious schools to more prestigious schools, as Summers claimed.286
Black applicants, she found, are the group most severely affected by
an abandonment of race. 217 "Among the 3435 black applicants who
were accepted to at least one law school to which they applied, only
687 would have been accepted if the LSAT/UGPA-combined model
had been used as the sole means of making admission decisions. 288
Wightman also found that access declined significantly and dramati-
cally when the use of race was abandoned.28 9 These results led her to
conclude that "the impact of either of the tested models on the ethnic
diversity of the admitted students would be devastating. 29 °
In sum, the data presented in the Wightman "study provide bleak
prospects for continued ethnic diversity in legal education if admis-
sion decisions depend on a model defined exclusively by LSAT score
and UGPA or, by extension, an admission practice that yields results
that parallel those predicted by a LSAT/UGPA model. ' 291 Independ-
ent studies from states like California, which has, by law, abolished
the use of race in admissions decisions in public institutions, corrobo-
rate Professor Wightman's findings. 292 Without using race as a factor
in admissions decisions, leading educational institutions, funded by
taxpayers, such as the University of Michigan involved in the Grutter
and Gratz cases, would be all-white. 293 "Of the 828 students admitted
to the ... University of California at Berkeley [Law School] in 1997,
only fifteen were black. ' 294 This number contrasted dramatically with
the seventy-five black students admitted in 1996, prior to the imple-
285. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944, 962 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996).
286. Wightman, supra note 256, at 15-16. Contra Summers, supra note 279, at 384.
Wightman studied minority groups including blacks, American Indians, Asian Americans,
Hispanics, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans. Wightman, supra note 256, at 15. Sum-
mers looked at minority students, "defined as Negroes, Chicanos, Indians and Puerto Ricans."
Summers, supra note 279, at 377.
287. Wightman, supra note 256, at 16.
288. Id. at 15. UGPA stands for undergraduate grade point average. Id. at 2.
289. Id. at 15-16.
290. Id. at 15.
291. Id. at 53.
292. Theodore Cross & Robert Bruce Slater, Special Report: Why the End of Affirma-
tive Action Would Exclude All but a Very Few Blacks from America's Leading Universities
and Graduate Schools, 17 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 8, 14 (1997).
293. See id. at 14-15.
294. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 140, at 7.
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mentation of the California Civil Rights Initiative forbidding the use
of racial preferences in public education.295 In Grutter, the testimony
of the University of Michigan Law School's expert, Dr. Stephen
Raudenbush, painted a similarly negative picture regarding the pre-
dicted effect of eliminating race as a factor in the law school's admis-
sions process.296 Raudenbush believed "a race-blind admissions sys-
tem would have a 'very dramatic,' negative effect on . . . minority
admissions. ' 297 For example, he explained, "in 2000, 35 percent of
underrepresented minority applicants were admitted. ' 298 If race were
removed as a factor, "only 10 percent of those applicants would have
been admitted. Under this scenario, underrepresented minority stu-
dents would have constituted 4 percent of the entering class in 2000
instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent. '29 9 Given these dire statis-
tics, it is not difficult to see why the law school adopted a policy of
enrolling a critical mass or meaningful number of minority students.3°°
Professor Wightman also discussed the ineffectiveness of using
non-racial factors, such as socioeconomic status, as a surrogate for
race in an attempt to achieve diversity. 301 She warned about "the
negative consequences [that flow from] misuse or overuse of the
[LSAT] in the admission process. 30 2 LSAT scores can predict suc-
cess in the first year of law school, but the use of the test for broader
purposes can damage its validity.3 3 "[A] test that does a very good
job of measuring a narrow, albeit important, range of acquired aca-
demic skills cannot serve as a sole determinant in the allocation of
limited educational opportunity. ' ' 3° She believed "[n]either LSAC, as
the developer of the LSAT, nor the law schools, as users of the scores
and gatekeepers of the profession, should tolerate such abuse.- 30 5
"[I]nappropriate use of those measures [can] result[] not only in a loss
of validity but [also] systematic and predictable discriminatory selec-
tion in our nation's law schools. ' 3°
295. Id. at 6-7.
296. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. (citation omitted).
300. See id. at 316.
301. Wightman, supra note 256, at 39-45.
302. Id. at 30.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 30-31.
305. Id. at 53.
306. Id. Professors Littlejohn and Rubinowitz give a similarly negative assessment of
the LSAT on the admission chances of black law school applicants. Littlejohn & Rubinowitz,
39
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The records of negative effects for minorities, actual and pro-
jected, arising from ceasing to use race as a factor in admissions to
law and other professional schools, have led former staunch opponents
of race-conscious programs, like Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer,
to tone down or even completely rethink their oppositions to affirma-
tive action.3 °7 Professor Glazer warns that "an insistence on color-
blindness [will] effective[ly] exclu[de] . . . African Americans from
positions of influence, wealth, and power. ' ' 308  He states that
"[a]ffirmative action [gives] African American students ... access to
prestigious universities [like] Harvard and Berkeley, . . . long [the]
gateways to positions of power and influence in America[] .,,0
If test scores and grades alone were used to determine admission to top
level universities, the percentage of African Americans attending major
colleges or universities would drop from six percent to less than two per-
cent. Denying African American students access to top tier universities
would undermine the value of inclusion that is vital to American democ-
racy and send a message of despair to blacks. 310
These words mark a major turnaround for a scholar who, in 1975,
in the days before white male complaints about reverse discrimination
came into vogue, authored a critique of racial preferences likening af-
firmative action to affirmative discrimination.311
In addition to its now undisputedly negative consequences, cessa-
tion of race also is pointless for society because the use of race hurts
whites little, but entails destructive consequences for blacks. An im-
portant recent work by two former Ivy League university presidents,
which studied the impact of race in college admissions, revealed that
if affirmative action were eliminated at five elite schools, the admis-
supra note 156, at 427. In their study of black enrollment in law schools, they assessed that
"[tihe evolution of the LSAT from a threshold to a relative measure led to law schools' dis-
proportionate rejection of Black applicants." Id.; see also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 320 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting). Justice Douglas believed the LSAT works against a
racially neutral admission system because it is racially biased in favor of white applicants.
See id. at 334 ("[M]inorities have cultural backgrounds that are vastly different from the
dominant Caucasian.... [And they] come from such disparate backgrounds that a test sensi-
tively tuned for most applicants would be wide of the mark for many minorities."). He stated
that the abolition of the LSAT would be a good "start" in the design of a racially neutral ad-
mission regime. Id. at 340.
307. Glazer, supra note 1, at 15; see also NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL
MULTICULTURALISTS Now (1997).
308. Glazer, supra note 1, at 15.
309. Id. at 14.
310. Id.
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sion probability for white applicants at those schools would rise only
to 26.5% from 25%.312 Black applicants would be the ones that feel
more of the pain numerically, in that the 1.5% admissions gain for
whites would come at a cost equaling about half of the elite colleges'
black students. 1 3
Individuals and groups who argue for enthronement of color-
blindness in decisions relating to admissions in law and other profes-
sional schools point to the declining significance of race, among other
reasons. 3  But as one analyst thoughtfully points out, "[t]he declining
significance of race is not the same as the utter insignificance of race.
Few whites would be willing to be black. 315 Stated differently, "fa-
voritism for white people in the United States is such a strong, invio-
lable part of our country that for African Americans to have a fair
chance, they have to be actively considered. ' '316 America gains little
in a highly competitive global economy where a major portion of the
population is excluded unfairly, supposedly based on merit. The use
of race is an important means today for promoting the active consid-
eration of blacks and other minorities for places in law schools. 317
Even conservative politicians and office holders opposed to affirma-
tive action in public decision making allow some room for the use of
race. Such is the disposition of some members of the Rehnquist
Court, including Justice O'Connor, author of the Grutter decision, and
former Chief Justice Rehnquist.318 The position of President George
W. Bush on affirmative action also bears out this disposition. The
President says he prefers "race-neutral approaches" and his Justice
Department filed briefs in the two Michigan cases "urging the Su-
preme Court to strike down the school's race-conscious admissions
policies," alleging that they were "disguised quotas. 319 Yet the Presi-
312. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 36 (1998).
313. Id. at 35.
314. See, e.g., FRANK H. Wu, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE
135 (2002).
315. Id.
316. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 140, at 7 (quoting Professor Paul Butler of
George Washington University Law School).
317. Id.
318. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the majority opinion
written by Justice O'Connor upholding the University of Michigan Law School's use of race
in admissions); see also id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (maintaining that the use of
race in admissions decisions must meet strict scrutiny, which the University of Michigan Law
School's plan failed to do).
319. Bob Kemper, Democrats Hope Court Rulings Bruise Bush, CHI. TRIB., June 24,
2003, at C17; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9,
Grutter v. Bolfinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635; Brief for United
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dent "said he supports 'affirmative access,' which he defines as in-
creasing access for minorities without using quotas. 3 20  A measure
short of quotas of the kind the President advocates, designed con-
sciously to expand access to minorities, cannot be race-neutral.3 2'
V. GRUTFER AS CULMINATION AND CONGEALMENT OF BEST PRACTICES
IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION SINCE BAKKE
Grutter was inevitable as a culmination and congealment of best
practices on the use of race as a factor in admissions to law schools
that has been building since Bakke. Two important aspects mark this
inevitability. The first is that the decision presents the Supreme
Court's idea, a long time in the making, of what constitutes a proper
constitutional formula on the application of race in decision making
relating to admissions decision of public education institutions. The
second is a message relating to the Court's understanding of the im-
perativeness of diversity in American life. Each of these two points is
discussed in turn.
First, in Grutter, the Supreme Court presented to the nation a for-
mula that it considered acceptable under the Constitution for the ap-
plication of race in decision making relating to admissions in public
education institutions.3 22  After helping to bring "separate but equal"
to an end, it took awhile before the Court embraced affirmative action
as a tool of inclusiveness and reparation for past discrimination
against minorities in American society. For example, in 1974 a dis-
pute arose involving a race-conscious program at the University of
Washington Law School on which the high court refused to substan-
tively rule.3 23 In Bakke, the Court recognized affirmative action as a
principle that can be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No.
02-516), 2003 WL 151258.
320. Kemper, supra note 319.
321. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(calling the so-called race-neutral plans of the kind practiced in states such as Texas, Califor-
nia, and Florida "disingenuous, [given that] they unquestionably were adopted with the spe-
cific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans and Hispanics in the public
higher education system") (citation omitted).
322. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
323. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (dismissing the case as moot
on the ground that DeFunis, who had attended the law school while the case was in the courts,
was about to graduate). Four Justices, Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White, dis-
sented from the judgment. Id. at 320, 348. They asserted that the Court should have given
the case full consideration and warned that the controversy would inevitably wind its way
back to the Court. Id. at 350. Justice Douglas also wrote a separate opinion in which he
reached the merits. Id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the U.S. Constitution. However, it could not find the program under
challenge constitutionally permissible because, in its view, the pro-
gram used a quota.324 In the aftermath of Bakke, the Court grew con-
servative in its composition and, consistent with the mood of the pe-
riod, equally averse to race-conscious preferential programs. The
hostility to race-conscious programs extended to lower federal courts,
some of which, like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood v.
Texas, came to question the precedential standing or authority of Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in Bakke.325 In Grutter, a quarter century after
Bakke, the Court finally stopped the legal and constitutional bleeding
by not only declaring affirmative action constitutional, but also by
finding an actual affirmative action plan that meets the constitutional
billing-one that both made race a "plus" factor and was properly in-
dividualized, consistent with the counsel of Justice Powell.326 Addi-
tionally, to avoid any doubt, in striking down the race-conscious pro-
gram in Gratz, the Court illustrated what a constitutionally race-
conscious program may not look like.327
Since the 1980s when law schools started to commit themselves to
diversifying their student body in an attempt to increase minority par-
ticipation in the legal profession, diversity has been an important
value in consideration for admission into law schools.32 8 Many law
schools adopt admissions policies similar to the University of Michi-
gan Law School's program the Court approved in Grutter.329 It is pos-
sible that in upholding the race-conscious program in Grutter, while
striking down the one in Gratz, the Court sent the message that it is
more willing to use race to promote diversity in professional schools
than in undergraduate, non-professional settings. Whatever the rea-
son, it is not accidental that the program the Court found acceptable in
Grutter was a plan developed by a law school. The authorities of the
University of Michigan indicated, defending the race-conscious pro-
324. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 378-79 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
325. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
326. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
327. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
328. See ABA Brief, supra note 264, at 2; see also OFFICIAL GUIDE 2002 ED., supra
note 162, at 10 (stating that one of the factors that law schools may consider in admissions is
ethnic or racial background).
329. Greenburg, supra note 143. "Most schools do what the [University of Michigan]
Law School does." Id. (quoting John Yoo, a former official in the Bush administration and
former official of the American Enterprise Institute, now a law professor at the University of
Chicago Law School).
43
Aka: Assessing the Impact in Grutter on the Use of Race in Law School
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
gram under challenge in Grutter, that they based their admissions pol-
icy on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, including the Harvard ad-
missions plan Powell appended to his opinion.33 As Professor Klar-
man concluded, "Race-based affirmative action in university
admissions is likely to be with us for many years to come." '331 This,
without doubt, includes admissions into law schools. For as Justice
Ginsburg eloquently opined in her dissent in Gratz, in removing "[t]he
stain of generations of racial oppression ... in our society," institu-
tions of higher learning "will seek to maintain their minority enroll-
ment. 3 32  With or without Grutter, university admissions officers
would include race as a factor in making admissions decisions. 33 The
real question then becomes whether they do so through fully disclosed
race-conscious programs, or through "camouflage[s]" like "winks,
nods, and disguises" designed to conceal the use of race.334
A second sense which makes Grutter inevitable as a culmination
and congealment of best practices in the use of race relates to the mes-
sage the decision sends about diversity. Courts play a critical role in
society "in 'consolidating cultural [norms],' legitimizing them and
translating [those norms] into 'binding legal principle[s].' ' 335 This is
especially so with a national high court like the United States Supreme
Court.336 As Professor Klarman points out, "Grutter reveals how
deeply entrenched the notion that all of our social, political, and eco-
nomic institutions should 'look like America' has become. Justice
O'Connor's conservative commitment to preserving the status quo
trumped her ideological aversion to race-conscious government reme-
dies." '337 Public administration scholar Norma Riccucci, in a salient
piece published in 2002 before the issuance of the Michigan cases, re-
330. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314, 335.
331. Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All that Important?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 8, 2003, at B10.
332. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
333. See Klarman, supra note 331 ("University admissions officers will naturally be
relieved that the court [sic] has permitted them to do openly what they would otherwise have
been inclined to do clandestinely.").
334. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accused by the Chief Justice
that she suggests "changing the Constitution so that it conforms to the conduct of the universi-
ties," Justice Ginsburg fired back that "the Constitution, properly interpreted, permits gov-
ernment officials to respond openly to the continuing importance of race" and, particularly,
that "[a]mong constitutionally permissible options, those that candidly disclose their consid-
eration of race seem to me preferable to those that conceal it." Id. at 305 n. 1l (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
335. Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Tenn, Justices Remake the Law, and the
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al (quoting Professor Paul Gewirtz of Yale Law School).
336. See id.
337. Klarman, supra note 331.
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inforced this point about diversity. Professor Riccucci pronounced
"the Immortality of Affirmative Action." '338 Despite the regressive rul-
ings of the courts on the policy and the numerous voter initiatives
across the United States banning the use of race, she said, "public- and
private-sector employers continue to rely on affirmative action as well
as other programs and techniques in an effort to prevent employment
discrimination or to create greater diversity in their workplaces. 33 9
She ended on the important note of prediction that "affirmative action
may be around for a long time, or at least until it is truly no longer
needed, that is, when discriminatory practices cease to exist and when
diverse workforces become the norm in this nation.""34 Although her
essay focused on the use of race in employment hiring, her insight
sheds useful light on the issue here.
VI. IMPACT OF THE GRUTTER DECISION ON RACE-CONSCIOUS PROGRAMS
In their dissents in Gratz, Justices Ginsburg and Souter dwelt on
the necessity for candor, not subterfuge, regarding application of race
in admissions to public education institutions.3 41 In the aftermath of
Grutter, public education institutions could be "tempted to back away
from affirmative action to avoid lawsuits. 3 42 Following Hopwood v.
Texas, some colleges and universities adopted "disingenuous wink-
and-nod practices designed to [overcome] the . . . prohibition . . .
[against] racial and ethnic preferences" that the decision imposed on
schools. 43 The momentousness of the Michigan cases, particularly
Grutter, lies in the fact that public universities and colleges are no
longer compelled to resort to underhand practices when using race in
their admissions policies. The two decisions "left room for the na-
tion's public universities-and by extension other public and private
institutions-to seek ways to take race into account."3" Higher edu-
cation institutions, public and private, can now use race openly-
though "not too openly, given Gratz."345
338. Riccucci, supra note 140, at 72.
339. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
340. Id.
341. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 297-98 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 304-
05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
342. Affirmative Action Fight Far from over, Urban League Panelists Say, BLACK
ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 28, 2003, at 10.
343. Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action Is Poor Public Policy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash., D.C.), May 2, 2003, at B10.
344. The Thin Race Line, supra note 143.
345. Klarman, supra note 331. Some commentators worry whether individualized re-
view is possible with huge multiversities, like New York University, with tens of thousands of
new applications annually. Contra Diane C. Yu, A Boost for Diversity--and America, N.Y.
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Consistent with this sentiment, educators and university adminis-
trators all across the land have indicated that the rulings afforded them
discretion to "weigh[] race as one of many factors in admission[]" de-
cisions.346 Among these educational leaders is Carol Geary Schneider,
President of the Association of American Colleges and Universities,
whose accurate assessment of the Michigan cases is that "[t]he courts
have recognized that racial inequality still disfigures our democracy
and that higher education can and should play a crucial role in closing
the opportunity gap.""3 7 Though speaking in a different context, one
analyst makes precisely the same point, when he points out that inter-
jecting race as a factor in admissions decisions "compel[s] us to real-
ize that merit comes in many forms, and the distribution of rewards
can be made more just.' '34
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article assessed the impact of the Supreme Court' decision
in Grutter on the use of race in law school admissions. It presents one
understanding of the decision as a jellification of best practices in law
school admissions that has been culminating in the twenty-five years
since Bakke in 1978, but at the same time also argues that the decision
is momentous in that law schools can now apply race as a factor in
admissions decisions with little fear of litigation. The Article addi-
DAILY NEWS, June 25, 2003. On the other hand, some university officials believe such indi-
vidualized review is possible. Id. Legal educator Professor Guinier appears to share the same
view, but also advises:
Where the crush of applicants overwhelms the universities' administrative capaci-
ties, large undergraduate institutions might do well to consider a program like a
percentage plan ... one like that of the University of Texas at Austin .... The
plan has the virtue of recognizing the importance of racial, geographic, and socio-
economic diversity.
Given the court's imprimatur to holistic considerations of race, it should be
possible now to fine-tune admissions programs further to create a pool of qualified
students based on high-school rank and then encourage individualized assessments
within that pool. In addition, special outreach and targeted financial aid can help
reinforce commitments to racial, geographic, and socioeconomic diversity.
Guinier, supra note 15. But the Supreme Court had problems with these plans, stating that
they have little relevance in graduate and professional schools and they may preclude indi-
vidualized assessment. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (responding to the
amicus curiae brief filed by the United States government). Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent,
said these plans are race-conscious and that calling them "'race-neutral' [is] disingenuous."
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303 n. 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The genius of Professor Guinier's sug-
gestion lies in her marriage of devices (individualized review and percentage plans) that oth-
ers-including the Supreme Court-would regard as mutually exclusive.
346. Winter, supra note 142.
347. Id.
348. Wu, supra note 315, at 151.
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tionally embodies extensive discussions on the Grutter case and its re-
lationship to Gratz, the nature of minority participation in American
legal education, and the influence of race in law school admissions.
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